EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After a decade of conflict and displacement, the 2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) strengthens the peace process and lays the groundwork for recovery and reconstruction. The Darfur Regional Authority (DRA), Government of Sudan and the international community recognise the need to have a coordinated and comprehensive strategy for supporting peace and development in the region. In accordance with the provisions of the DDPD, the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission (DJAM) was conducted in the latter part of 2012. Informed by the needs and priorities of communities, identified through comprehensive, consultative workshops in all five Darfur states and the refugee communities in Chad, the Darfur Development Strategy (DDS) evolved. The DDS, presented here, offers a sequenced, coordinated and holistic plan for equitable, sustainable and participatory development vital to move Darfur out of a cycle of conflict and poverty, towards a stable and prosperous future. The International Donor Conference for Reconstruction and Development in Darfur in Doha on 7-8 April 2013 will reaffirm the world’s commitment to the people of Darfur and to the stability of the region.

THE DARFUR CONTEXT

Darfur has long been a land riven by conflict, misunderstanding and insecurity. The underlying causative factors are complex and exist in local, regional, national and international theatres simultaneously. Simmering tensions through the 1990s exploded in 2003, as self-defence groups militarised into armed resistance and initiated a significant conflict that would ravage Darfur over the next three years. This resulted in the internal displacement of an estimated 1.7 million people, as well as a flood of 280,000 refugees, particularly non-Arabs from Western Darfur, into Chad as refugees.

Virtually the entire population of Darfur - an estimated 8 million - is arguably affected by the conflict. Apart from the 2 million that are still displaced, including refugees - 80% of whom lost everything they owned - every community, whether they be sedentary rural farmers, nomadic pastoralists, public sector workers or urban dwellers, have seen their livelihoods disintegrate and their freedom of movement and personal security severely threatened or compromised. Government services - especially health, education and water services to the rural communities - have been overloaded or stopped. The conflict damaged and destroyed infrastructure, seriously curtailed markets and disrupted trade, employment and, as confidence eroded, investment in much-needed development of the region diminished. Approximately 38% of the total population of Darfur, more than 3 million people, have received some form of monthly food aid or for the past decade.

In addition to the massive conflict-driven disruption of Darfur’s economy over the last ten years, Sudan’s economy now also faces hurdles. Following the large economic shock caused by the loss of oil revenue due to secession of South Sudan, which lead the economy to contract by 3.3% in 2011 and by a further 11.1% in 2012, the overall fiscal deficit was expected to increase to 3.7% in 2012. In the 2013 budget the funding gap stands at SDG10 billion (US$2.1 billion), a full one-third of the budget. Both policy reforms adopted by the Government in June 2012 that incorporate necessary austerity measures and the implementation of the recent agreement with South Sudan on oil-related issues should create a gradual improvement in Sudan’s economic and financial
conditions in 2013 and 2014. Nonetheless, Sudan’s recovery will depend critically on continued fiscal discipline, especially a careful prioritisation of recurrent and development spending. The above factors will somewhat limit the Government’s ability to support recovery and reconstruction in Darfur from its own resources.

Both the macro and regional context are cause for concern. Poverty levels in Darfur are among the highest in the country, with almost two thirds of the population falling below the poverty line. Human development indicators are among the worst in Africa. The delivery of essential services of health, education and water are severely constrained not just by the conflict but by the limited human and financial resources available to the region. Prior to the conflict and over the last ten years, Darfur States have received less than half of the fiscal transfers than those allocated to states with comparable population and administration. This, coupled with deficiencies in federal administration in policing, security and judiciary give continued validity to the claims of marginalisation. The region is strikingly dependent on these federal transfers, as state revenues - hampered as they are by insecurity - contribute less than 20% of the fiscal resources available.

The situation is expected to be further aggravated since the formation of two additional Darfur states at the beginning of 2012. Finally, development spending within Darfur states is comparatively less than half of other states in Sudan. This inequity in Government provision will also need to be addressed in 2013, in parallel with the special funds committed under the DDPD, in order to support and maintain long-term development in Darfur.

**THE DARFUR PEACE PROCESS**

The numerous, diverse circumstances contributing to the conflict necessitated an intricate and lengthy peace process, which began in N’djaména in 2003, continued in Abuja in 2006 and culminated in Doha in 2009. The displacement of a large proportion of the population, the disrupted livelihoods and insecurity, have all hampered investment in human resources and physical infrastructure, thereby stifling recovery and development of the beleaguered region - a situation exacerbated by the lack of implementation of a substantive peace agreement. Following months of intensive negotiations between rebel groups and the Government of Sudan, the second peace agreement of the overarching peace process was finally achieved in Qatar in July 2011: the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. While it is primarily an agreement between the Liberation and Justice Movement and the Government, the signatories have continued to call upon other actors and movements to sign the Agreement.

Article 31 of the DDPD delineates the main objectives of post-conflict economic recovery and development, and highlights that the strategy:

“…shall aim at realising short-term and medium-term objectives in the fields of rehabilitation, reconstruction, construction and development taking into consideration urgent needs and the need to work out the basis for long-term development. Special attention shall be given to programmes and projects which will enable Darfur to speed up the transition from relief to development.”

The conditions on the ground are often difficult and the peace tenuous, but the very real needs of the people of Darfur have been articulated throughout the assessments undertaken by the DJAM. There will likely never be a time when an ideal set of conditions for recovery is apparent in
Darfur. However, the momentum gathered by the DDPD should not be allowed to wane. Delays can only increase the difficulty of recovery: Darfur’s population has more than doubled in the last 25 years and, due to the conflict and lack of investment, generations of youth are growing up in confined areas, unskilled and dependent on aid. The major concern of the displaced over the occupation of their land by strangers will be more difficult to remedy, as it becomes entrenched by time and usage; while continued environmental degradation due to economic necessity will only be exacerbated without corrective measures. Furthermore, it is difficult to maintain a relief-oriented international response to the humanitarian needs of Darfur without a positive plan for the future. When the DPA was signed in Abuja in 2006 by one of the powerful parties to the conflict the first comprehensive DJAM was undertaken - yet the international community deemed the situation then as “not conducive to development” and the DJAM and its recommendations were, consequently, abandoned. As a result, peace could not be sustained; conflict and uncertainty persisted for six more years. Once again, the current conditions may not be perfect, but - and it is an all-important but - the people are ready for change, the people want a resolution and they need help - international assistance - to overcome their pressing concerns of water, education, security and healthcare, supported by systemic and institutional improvements in Rule of Law, private sector development and natural resource management; not as a humanitarian necessity, but to enable a stable and enjoyable way of life. It would be a tragic mistake to postpone this recovery until there are a set of presumably “perfect” conditions.

Moreover, long-term provision of food and other handouts often disrupt and prolong the recovery of normal economic functions. In Darfur, many of the urban economies now exist largely to serve the humanitarian effort. Residents of IDP camps and urban areas are provided a level of service provision that did not pre-exist the conflict. As such, an increasingly detrimental reality facing Darfur is that many Darfuri are dependent upon this “life-saving,” and yet paradoxically long-term, assistance.

A key theme of the DDPD is the recognition that assistance to Darfur must evolve. The intended transition from relief to development is therefore an integral and necessary component. Given Darfur’s prolonged insecurity, the majority of international assistance has quite understandably aimed to support and sustain displaced populations. Yet this protracted relief aid has done little to address the root causes of the crisis, nor has it enabled the people of Darfur and their government to more meaningfully dictate their own recovery and rehabilitation.

The literature is full of references to the two million internally displaced people (IDPs) but little on the number of communities that have been fragmented or destroyed. A recovery programme cannot address two million people individually, but it can target extensive reconstruction needs and service provision for conflict-affected communities and localities across the five states of Darfur. It can address the rehabilitation and restoration of livelihoods centred on community coexistence. It can provide the necessary improvement in governance at the Local and State levels to maintain the services and address the issues of land, compensation, peace, Rule of Law and stability, vital to sustain development. The Darfur Development Strategy aims to do just that.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGY

Article 31 of the DDPD specifies the far-reaching aims and objectives of a Darfur-driven development plan. These include, inter alia: the need to restore peace, security, and social
stability; improve government functionality at all levels; strengthen the civil administration; rehabilitate, reconstruct and construct physical, institutional and social infrastructure in post-conflict Darfur; and implement a comprehensive structural reform of educational and health institutions, especially Universities, in order to transform Darfur into a developed society in terms of technology, industry agriculture and trade.

To realise these high-reaching goals, Article 32 of the DDPD made provision for the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission. The DJAM commenced in August 2012, focusing on the priority sectors delineated in Article 31, from which ten thematic working groups were formed. These working groups comprised both lead and support agencies that included technical representatives from the UN, international organisations, international financial institutions and donors. Sudanese, especially Darfuri technical experts, formed an essential part of each thematic group. Each thematic working group reviewed the available literature - starting with the 2006 DJAM documents, then studies, budgets, plans and reports from 2006 to date - and prepared an individual Situational Analysis.

Next, in order to develop a robustly representational strategy and secure broad buy-in, the DJAM held five state-level consultative workshops in September and October 2012. Organised with the assistance of people specifically appointed by each State government, the DJAM engaged a diverse base of participants for each state workshop, including those from local NGOs, Native Administration, farmers, pastoralists, IDPs and both urban and rural populations, along with full representation from every Local Government Authority and State Line Ministry. Refugee input was received during a separate meeting in Abéché, Chad, in December 2012. The five workshops identified critical needs and priorities within each thematic area that were then integrated into a single costed framework of overall development objectives and expected outputs for the next six years. These were delineated by sequential activities deemed necessary to achieve the recovery and reconstruction of Darfur. This emphasis on pragmatic and incremental steps echoes the prominence of Article 31’s short- and medium-term objectives.

After the workshops, the lead and support agencies worked to compile the ten thematic working group reports that are provided as annexes to the overall Darfur Development Strategy. These reports thoroughly detail sector-specific, situational challenges, corresponding objectives identified by participants and agencies and resultant costing to meet these objectives.

While these reports are necessarily articulated by theme, it is important to remember that the conflict in Darfur has multiple origins. If the root causes are to be adequately addressed, then any recovery strategy should be “integrated and comprehensive”. The various Government departments and UN agencies have specific mandates, areas of expertise and interest and the tendency is to respond to problems in a sector-specific manner. This necessarily loses the coherence and nuanced inter-linkage between the overlapping sectors. Moreover, this often gives rise to uneven development, impeded by lack of support from vitally necessary components of other sectors.

The division into the ten groups was a working tool to gather the information. The groups should realistically be considered as individual bricks in the support fabric of a recovery, reconstruction and development strategy. Though independent in outline, each necessarily supports others and as such is a vital and integral part of the overall structure. The structure itself needs to be solidly
grounded on a strong foundation, built of enabling activities that will provide the essential information, skills, processes and basic physical capacity to support and maintain the desired recovery and development programmes.

The Darfur Development Strategy therefore recognises the shortfalls inherent within a project-based, sector-specific wish list and instead presents an integrated, comprehensive, stakeholder-driven roadmap to holistically initiate the ambitious, yet achievable, objective outlined by the DDPD - a stable, peaceful and prosperous Darfur. As evidenced in the schematic and description that follow, the independent bricks of the thematic groups lend themselves conceptually to the formation of three main pillars necessary to support the region-wide Darfur Development Strategy.

All aspects of recovery should not be ad hoc given that there are elements of all these that need to be developed as an integrated programme and in a time-conscious manner. Peace and Security addresses land and community reconciliation issues and reintegration; Governance and the Rule of Law - without which there will be no security - are necessary for long term expansion and maintenance of service capacity, regulation and the administration of Private Sector Development to ensure consistent economic recovery. The latter is vital to ensure adequate revenue collection to meet the service needs and general government function. Basic Services are of primary public interest and, without serious investment in both physical and human resources, early gains in community reconstruction cannot be maintained. The Development of Rural Livelihoods and the recovery of markets and livestock improvement are vital for the Return and Reintegration and stabilisation of the rural sector.

The goal was therefore to design a fully-integrated strategy supported by substantive groups of priority needs identified by the ten thematic areas, which were collated into the broad areas of governance, justice and reconciliation, reconstruction and economic recovery articulated in Article 31. These broad areas became the three interconnected pillars of the Darfur Development Strategy, soundly based on identified, immediate activities.
The Darfur Development Strategy

*Developing Darfur: A Reconstruction and Recovery Strategy*, the document’s full title, therefore presents an overview of the current situation in Darfur, articulates the strategy’s evolution and defines how it will be executed when funded. Section I provides a brief background to the strategy development process. Section II is a detailed situational analysis of Darfur, derived from a review of the studies, plans and policies pertaining to Darfur over the last 6 years (with particular reference to the DJAM 2006 documentation, the State 5-yr plans and the Federal Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP)), the reports of the ten thematic working groups and the extensive consultations with both citizens and the government authorities of Darfur in September and October 2012. The amalgamated, prioritised objectives, recommended activities and outputs are presented in Section III in a costed, broad, strategic framework for the key intervention areas that considers the scale, coverage and timeline of the perceived response. Every strategy must have a starting point and the DDS is firmly built on a foundation of identified activities that require immediate funding and initiation. The management of funds, quality assurance and essential monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are all detailed in Section IV.

However, it is important when designing such a programme to be clear by what is meant by *reconstruction* and *recovery* so that all parties may be satisfied by the outcome. A simple return to the pre-conflict *status quo* is not sufficient; the political, economic and geographical circumstances in Darfur that existed before the widespread conflict in 2003 gave rise to claims of marginalisation. Conversely, setting unrealistic expectations and proposing “ideal” conditions of rural existence - characterised by full access to basic services, modern housing, communications, improved rural livelihoods and alternative employment opportunities - is unrealistic in the short-term and cannot be maintained without sustained and transparent governance, effective fiscal...
management and amplified indigenous investment, all of which will require years of judicious and sustained planning, training and investment.

The DDS represents a transitional programme, in order to rebuild hope and a positive outlook, along with the delivery of tangible immediate peace dividends that lays the substantial groundwork necessary for lasting development. In fact, the cumulative objective of support to the Darfur Development Strategy is the establishment of a comprehensive system for economic recovery, development, planning and financial management that ensures the sustainability of the DDS beyond its six-year implementation period.

The three supportive, interlinked pillars are detailed in the paragraphs that follow:

**Pillar I: Governance, Justice and Reconciliation**

Peace in Darfur cannot be sustained without improved governance. This entails building representative, responsive and effective government institutions that are accountable to communities who wish to transition from circumstances of conflict and displacement towards rehabilitation and recovery.

The DDPD provides a good, albeit ambitious, framework for governance in Darfur. The political and legal context reflected in the DDPD has key implications for governance and accountability, as it stipulates that there shall be a federal system of government, with an effective devolution of powers and a clear distribution of responsibilities to ensure fair and equitable participation by the citizens of Sudan in general, and particularly those of Darfur.

To this end, the Darfur Development Strategy, through the Governance, Justice and Reconciliation pillar, aims to contribute policy support, technical assistance and capacity enhancement to State governments to enable them to more effectively execute their mandate, especially at the local (decentralised) level, and thus oversee recovery of the region and initiate the revival of basic infrastructure and support to conflict-affected populations.

**Pillar II: Reconstruction**

The main objective of the Reconstruction pillar is to support the recovery and stabilisation of war-affected populations, whose economic and social life have been severely disrupted. Fundamental to any recovery programme is the construction and restoration of physical infrastructure and basic service recovery, such as water supply in villages, schools, health posts and community...
policing, as well as linking communities and markets by constructing and improving vital road, rail and air links, promoting resource-efficient housing and restoring productive systems. This is all too often seen as the desirable end in itself, yet it must be closely linked to the previous pillar to ensure that infrastructure investments are well-managed and maintained. The rebuilding of the social infrastructure of Darfur - the return and re-establishment of the rural communities, the integration of people who wish to remain in the urban centres and the recovery of the residential war affected populations is a vital component of this Pillar, so that they may resume normal life and engage in productive economic activities - which, ultimately, links to the third pillar, Economic Recovery.

**Pillar III: Economic Recovery**

Through directly supporting agricultural operations, demarcating stock routes, promoting alternative energy sources and improving the business climate and access to credit, the main objective of the Economic Recovery pillar is to contribute positively towards poverty alleviation and transitioning Darfur to development in an equitable and environmentally sustainable manner. This will be achieved by support to key livelihoods, increasing access to those key livelihoods and financial services, and ensuring the sustainability of productive sectors; the latter requiring a review and strengthening of agricultural and livestock policies, regulatory instruments, and institutional arrangements in all 5 States. Success in these areas is vital for the generation of revenue to ensure the expansion, maintenance and quality of the Government services and physical infrastructure established under activities within the other two pillars.

Individual sector support is inadequate to ensure the success of the strategy without the recognition that the bar must be raised equally, necessitating balanced support to the development of each Pillar at the same time. Ultimately, the pillars themselves - though built of related themes and independent in outline - are dependent on each other for the sustainability and development of the whole. The Pillars are mutually supportive of the DDS and, as such, the equal development of each is vital to the integrity of the overall structure.

**THE DARFUR DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OBJECTIVES**

Given the overarching objective of the DDPD is “to support the transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery and development,” the objectives of the Darfur Development Strategy were identified by the individual groups then amalgamated in to the three-pillar approach.
Consolidated Objectives of the Darfur Development Strategy

To achieve the intended objectives of the pillars, donor support is required to assist the Darfur administration and civil society through various instruments (technical assistance, program and material funding/supply, policy/dialogue development), sequentially phased throughout the six-year Strategy period.

The DDS, like any structure, must be solidly grounded on a strong foundation. The sequencing of activities is vital to the strategy’s success, and the substantive objectives sought will not be achieved without a well-coordinated - and well-funded - plan. The three pillars are built upon
enabling activities that will provide the essential information, skills, processes and basic physical capacity to support and maintain the desired recovery and development programmes.

Workshop participants identified “foundational and short-term” (FaST) activities as immediate initiatives that can, and should, be either completed within 12 months or largely established and executed during this timeframe. Most importantly, they identified those activities that are essential pre-curors and pre-requisites for the start of longer term development programmes. The compilation of these activities advances the DJAM documentation beyond a simple “wish list” and articulates a measured and rational plan - one that is cognisant of timeliness, sequencing and available capacity.

These FaST activities will serve a few key purposes, all of which enhance the speed of transition from relief to development.

**Types of Foundational Activities**

FaST activities are the initial and immediate actions that kickstart the longer term objectives of the DDS. The funds necessary for their fulfillment will be drawn from the total monies pledged: they are not a separate entity or the “minimum requirement” to meet Darfur’s recovery needs. Rather, the activities identified are simply a calculation of the most strategic and time-sensitive funding, a multifaceted investment in the form of a sequenced strategy - and insurance that peace dividends are not only paid, but maintained. They will build confidence in the process and support for the DDS, cognisant of the initial absorption capacity. Training, capacity building and confidence-building in access and stabilisation, will further change the attitudes of a critical mass of Darfuris as humanitarian beneficiaries transition to drivers of proactive, self- and community-based and targeted recovery.

The Government of Sudan has reconfirmed its commitment over the next six years to the financial pledges stated in the DDPD. In early 2013, it provided a letter of credit for SDG800m
(approximately US$165m) to the DRA in an effort to meet its initial obligation as well as in-kind contributions to support the establishment and functionalisation of the DRA. Measures are underway to ensure that its additional financial obligations to Darfur are met.

The six-year plan to meet both social and infrastructural needs, totals **US$7,245,000,000**. The Government of Sudan has committed **US$2,650,000,000** to the DDPD over the next six years, leaving a donor requirement of **US$4,595,000,000**. In order to ensure that the foundations for the longer term development within **Governance, Justice and Reconciliation, Economic Recovery and Reconstruction**, are well-laid, an estimated **US$177,400,000** is required immediately from this total pledge to initiate and secure broad-level FaST activities within each of the three areas.

The very nature of the DDS requires that whatever may be generously pledged, the funds be available as and when required, over a large geographical area and through multiple channels. The management and disbursement of such funds, derived from disparate sources with, in all likelihood, specific accounting and monitoring requirements, calls for a dedicated mechanism agreed by all donors.

**FUNDING MECHANISM AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF THE DARFUR DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY**

Article 32 of the DDPD stipulates that “since the financial resources and expertise required to undertake such an operation are beyond Sudan's capacity, the Parties request the international community to urgently and fully participate in this initiative and assist in the provision of necessary resources and expertise and partake in meeting the needs set for this purpose through the establishment of a Multi-Donor Trust Fund. The operational procedures of the Fund shall be determined by a supervisory body to be established by the Donors and the GoS.” This statement was reinforced during the DJAM consultations when the State Governments confirmed that the State 5-year plans were developed on the basis of an expected 80% contribution from international donors. Consequently, as part of the DJAM, the United Nations and the World Bank have considered options for the coordination and funding of the recovery effort, based on an assessment of needs and context, initial discussions with counterparts, best practice and global experiences. The **Integrated Coordination and Financing Framework for the Implementation of the Darfur Development Strategy** aims to help the international community coordinate its support in alignment with the DDS priorities, the Government of Sudan and the DDPD.

It is unlikely that any single funding arrangement will attract a majority of the funds intended to support the recovery effort in Darfur. Rather, multiple financing channels are likely to operate that reflect the wide range of financing sources, including the Government of Sudan, Gulf donors and Arab funds, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD (e.g. China, Turkey, etc.) bilateral donors, the European Union and the private sector itself. In line with Article 32 of the DDPD, a funding mechanism is therefore proposed that combines effective coordination with the flexibility partners require for them to contribute to the common effort. The mechanism offers 4 distinct channels of funding and embeds these in a common coordination structure:

- The “Darfur Facility”, a newly established 2 or 3-window multi-donor trust fund set up by the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions in line with Article 32 of the DDPD
- Coordinated parallel funding
- Government funding through the national budget
- Private investor funding through the High Investment Council of Sudan

The Darfur Facility will serve as a transparent and accountable mechanism to promote the coherence and effectiveness of international partners’ support to the implementation of the DDPD, in close coordination with the DRA and the Government of Sudan. It will provide a vehicle for the Government and partners to translate the financial commitments made by the international community into tangible development results. It will provide a vehicle for the Government and partners to translate the financial commitments made by the international community into tangible development results. However, the new funding facility will not be an exclusive vehicle. In addition to pooled donor funds, “Parallel Funding” can also support the DDS alongside the Darfur Facility funds. There are also a range of different actors and interests working in support of the relief effort through various funding channels that will continue. These include the private sector and the Government via regular sector allocations through its national budget and specific mechanisms and allocations for Darfur.

The main advantage of this situation is that it will allow for a flexible and rapid response. However, it also increases the need for a strong governance arrangement that can oversee the different strands of the recovery effort to avoid duplication or gaps. Therefore, the new facility will only be effective if it is appropriately embedded within a wider governance structure and with comprehensive governance arrangements that reflect the political and institutional realities of the context. With that in mind, an Integrated Coordination and Financing Framework is proposed to maintain flexibility and speed, while ensuring an overarching coordination of effort under joint leadership of the government and the international community.

Experience in other challenging contexts demonstrates the importance of putting in place a robust system for monitoring operational implementation, as well as the sustainability of investments. Thus, Quality Assurance is a critical requirement for successful implementation of the DDS, for accountability over the use of funds and for the creation of sustainable capacity in Sudanese institutions. Additionally, given the implementation and oversight challenges the Darfur context presents, this framework recommends that an independent Verification Unit should also be put in place.

The latter creates a specific opportunity to utilise the University network in Darfur to create an indigenous Monitoring and Evaluation department, using a pool of Sudanese experts who will be tasked to provide monitoring and evaluation teams, with the inclusion of external experts provided by various donors as required. Part of this monitoring would be to act as a central repository for copies of all documentation from all parties involved - studies, plans, programmes and projects, along with reference documents used in the implementation of the resulting Darfur recovery.

The DDPD proposes an ambitious framework for peace in Darfur, and the design of the DDS acknowledges the inherent risk and challenges that come in tandem with a broad, multi-sectoral recovery and development strategy. As earlier referenced, foundational activities enable both tangible peace dividends and consistent public messaging regarding the progress of DDPD and DDS implementation - particularly important factors when expectancy is high and widespread,
but delivery is initially limited by start-up capacities and system formation. Moreover, the DDS itself articulates a number of political, economic and environmental risks, in addition to security- and access-related threats that could endanger the execution of the DDS. Through its endorsement of the strategy, the Government of Sudan is cognisant of the risks and challenges expressed by the broad base of representatives at the consultative workshops. While neither the DRA nor the Government of Sudan are able to mitigate every risk, commitments have been offered to minimise manageable variables, while the strategy itself supports a reasonable, risk-averse and rational plan of implementation. The proposed follow-up performance assessment conference will allow for adjustment and modification of the expectations and modalities.

**CONCLUSION**

Donor support to recovery and development based on the needs assessed by the DJAM and articulated in the *Darfur Development Strategy* is therefore required to accelerate implementation of the DDPD and mitigate the risks that inaction would inevitably bring. In order to ensure a sound investment, the DDS has incorporated lessons learnt from prior assessments and funding appeals; ones that have been hindered by either a lack of security and/or funding. The focus here is therefore two-fold. First, to begin the process with incremental, realistic steps: both to provide an expedient “peace dividend” for Darfuris and to create trust among local communities; along with firm, secure, early, milestones on the road to recovery. Second, to support the transition from relief-orientated and humanitarian aid patterns to more durable and lasting development assistance. The DDS addresses the needs and priorities identified through the DJAM, aiming to increase the capacity and responsibility, including assuming fiscal oversight and management, of Darfuris and the local and federal governments that serve them.

The conditions on the ground may be difficult, and the peace tenuous, but the very real needs of the people of Darfur that have been incorporated in the DDPD and articulated throughout the DJAM and targeted by the DDS remain paramount. There will likely never be a time when an ideal set of conditions for recovery are apparent in Darfur. However, the momentum gathered by the DDPD should not be allowed to wane. The last ten years of conflict, marginalisation and insecurity may have left the region ravaged, but the active engagement and intense responses of the Darfuri people during the wide consultation reveals their hope and trust in the future. Despite the continued security breaches they insist they are ready to move forward, away from the humanitarian crisis that has blighted their lives towards a new era of peace, development and security for all Darfur. They rely on the continued, generous international assistance to realise this dream.